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COMMENTS
NEPA'S ROLE IN PROTECTING THE
WORLD ENVIRONMENT
INTRODUCTION
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969,' is
designed to ensure that actions of the United States government reflect
environmental concerns as well as political and economic pressures. It
requires all federal agencies undertaking "major actions" that may
have significant environmental effects to prepare an environmental im-
pact statement (EIS) detailing foreseeable environmental consequences
of and alternatives to the proposed action.2 Whether NEPA requires an
EIS for federal projects undertaken abroad has been a continuing
source of controversy. The federal agencies often object to preparing
EIS's because of the extra time, expense and effort they involve.' The
foreign country may object (often supported by our State Department4)
on the ground that its sovereignty will be infringed by such prepara-
tion.5 Both groups claim that Congress did not intend NEPA to apply
to foreign projects.
Congress never fully considered the issue, so the statutory lan-
guage and legislative history of the Act are inconclusive.6 The federal
courts have largely avoided the issue, ruling explicitly on NEPA's for-
eign reach in only one case.7 Agency practices have varied considera-
bly,8 and the Executive Order which was promulgated to resolve the
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976).
2 Id. § 4332(2)(C).
s See infra note 47.
See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 97-154 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 48-72 and accompanying text.
7 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1345
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (no EIS required for a nuclear reactor export license when the effects are con-
fined solely to the recipient country). Other courts have avoided the issue by assuming NEPA
applicable or because defendants either failed to object to NEPA's extraterritorial reach or settled.
See Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (in an action contesting construction of
highway in Panama, the court assumed, without deciding, that NEPA was fully applicable to
construction in Panama); National Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. United States, 452
F. Supp. 1226 (D.D.C. 1978) (NEPA assumed fully applicable to paraquat-spraying program in
Mexico); Sierra Club v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 4 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 20,685
(D.D.C. 1974) (AEC agreed to prepare a generic EIS on the nuclear export program, allowing
the court to avoid the issue); People of Enewetak v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811 (D. Hawaii 1973)
(NEPA found applicable to United States trust territories; unnecessary for court to decide NEPA's
general extraterritorial reach).
' See, e.g., Export-Import Bank Regulations, 12 C.F.R. §§ 408-409 (1983); Agency for In-
ternational Development Regulations, 22 C.F.R. § 216 (1982); Department of Defense Regula-
tions, 32 C.F.R. § 197 (1982).
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controversy falls short of fulfilling NEPA's mandate. Fourteen years
after the enactment of NEPA it is still unclear when the EIS process
should be applied to United States actions abroad."0
This Comment argues that courts should extend their active role
in NEPA litigation concerning domestic projects to foreign agency ac-
tivity and provide needed guidance in interpreting the statute. The
Comment first looks at EIS's generally and suggests their potential use-
fulness for agency decisionmaking concerning actions abroad. After ex-
amining some areas of federal foreign-policy-making in which EIS's
would make a significant contribution, and suggesting that environmen-
tal concerns cannot effectively be addressed on a national basis, the
Comment reviews NEPA's statutory language and legislative history,
and an Executive Order which tried to resolve the conflicting
interpretations.
The Comment concludes that the primary objection to NEPA's
application abroad, the potential infringement on foreign sovereignty, is
not valid in many cases. Furthermore, when it is, the language of
NEPA is flexible enough to take that objection into account. Thus,
NEPA applies to foreign projects undertaken by federal agencies, and
courts, as a general rule, should require that the EIS requirement ap-
ply but should permit exceptions on a case-by-case basis under a bal-
ancing test the Comment suggests. That test will allow courts to review
agency decisions on whether to prepare an EIS for federal actions
abroad in a manner which fulfills Congress's environmental mandate
but does not infringe unnecessarily on foreign sovereignty.
I. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS AND THEIR
USEFULNESS FOR FEDERAL ACTIONS ABROAD
A. General Considerations
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)1' ex-
presses a mandate so pervasive that it has been called an " 'environ-
mental bill of rights.' "12 In order to ensure that the government adopts
a systematic, interdisciplinary approach to project design, section
9 See infra text accompanying notes 76-96.
,0 For example, eight years after NEPA's enactment, Congress had the opportunity to con-
sider its foreign reach during debate on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act. Congress declined to
settle the question, even in the limited context of nuclear exports. See 124 CONG. REC. 2523
(1978) (remarks of Senator McClure).
1, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976).
"2 F. GRAD, 2 TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 9-6 (1980) (quoting Hanks & Hanks,
An Environmental Bill of Rights: The Citizen Suit and the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 230, 269 (1970)).
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102(2)(C),13 the major action-forcing provision, requires federal agen-
cies to prepare an EIS for all major actions with significant environ-
mental effects. The provision raises threshold questions of whether an
action is "major," whether it is sufficiently "Federal," and whether the
impact on the environment is "significant" enough to require an EIS.1
The tests for "major" action and "significant" effects tend to
merge, with agencies preparing an initial environmental assessment to
see if there will be a significant impact, in which case they will prepare
a formal impact statement.1 5 The Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ), an advisory body created by NEPA, has provided a list of rele-
vant considerations in determining whether to prepare an EIS.11 Some
of these are: the degree to which an action affects public health and
safety, the environmental riskiness of the project, effects on endangered
species, and the probability that the action may establish a precedent
for future actions.
Section 102(2)(C) requires that an EIS address five areas,1" in-
cluding any unavoidable adverse impact on the environment and re-
sources, and any reasonable alternatives to the proposal. The informa-
tion gathered in the EIS must be supplemented by consultations with
other agencies, 8 and comments made by the public. 19
'L 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) ("all agencies of the Federal Government shall. . .(C) include
in every recommendation or report on. . .major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment, [an EIS]").
14 These concepts have been defined in the NEPA regulations. 40 C.F.R. § 1508 (1982). In
addition, the courts have adopted a case-by-case approach to determine what actions are within a
particular definition. See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 627 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(granting licenses may be federal action); State of Alaska v. Andrus, 391 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1979)
(substantial federal funding may constitute federal action); Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (permission or approval by federal agency of private action, such as approving
leases, is federal action). See generally F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS 61-96 (1973). The
courts have also defined impact on the "human environment" to require an impact on the physical
environment. If that is present, however, an environmental impact statement can look at effects on
the social, economic, and cultural environment. See, e.g., Breckinridge v. Rumsfeld, 537 F.2d 864,
866 (6th Cir. 1976) and cases cited therein.
'5 U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS: AN
ANALYSIS OF SIX YEARS' EXPERIENCE BY SEVENTY FEDERAL AGENCIES 16 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as EIS REPORT].
1i CEQ Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 1508 (1982).
'17 (i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be
implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the mainte-
nance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved
in the proposed action should it be implemented.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976).
' Id.
29 CEQ Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1(a)(3)-(4) (1982).
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NEPA's exceedingly general language invites judicial interpreta-
tion, so, although NEPA does not specifically provide for judicial re-
view,2" the EIS requirement has been used by plaintiffs to gain review.
In fact, NEPA's "effectiveness is owed in large part to the fact that [the
EIS requirement] provides a point of entry for concerned citizens to
challenge government actions and to invoke the spirit of other sections
of NEPA."'
Preparation of an EIS is a procedural requirement designed to
ensure fully informed decisionmaking. Even if a significant negative en-
vironmental impact is revealed, the agency remains free to proceed with
its action.22 However, in reaching its decision, the agency must give
environmental factors good faith consideration," and a reviewing court
may overturn the decision to proceed with the action if it is found to be
arbitrary and capricious.24 Thus, an environmentally concerned group
has access to the courts to allege that an agency failed to prepare an
EIS when the statute required one25 or that the EIS prepared by an
agency was inadequate.2 6 NEPA provides new ground for review of
administrative actions, but it does not create any new causes of action .2
B. The EIS in the International Arena
In the international sphere, the benefits of EIS review have great
potential to improve federal programs, to help the United States avoid
diplomatically embarrassing program failures, to inform other nations
of the impact of American foreign actions, and to protect the United
States from environmental harm.
One important example is provided by environmental analysis of
foreign aid programs.2 8 In addition to preventing pollution and protect-
ing the existence of endangered species in other countries, environmen-
tal analysis can improve the efficiency and probability of success of
many assistance programs. In many instances, failure to anticipate en-
vironmental consequences has caused programs to fail or to have un-
20 See F. ANDERSON, supra note 14, at 16-17.
'l Id. at v.
See infra text accompanying note 122.
3 See F. GRAD, supra note 12, at 9-122 to 9-124.
24 See id.
25 Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Comm'n v. United States Postal Serv., 487
F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
26 Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (challenge to adequacy of EIS
prepared for Panama highway proposal).
F. GRAD, supra note 12, at 9-119 to 9-120.
Most foreign aid is administered by the Agency for International Development, an inde-
pendent body within the Department of State. Its statutory authorization is found in the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151-2443 (1976).
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foreseen, harmful results.29 For example, poorly planned agricultural
irrigation projects, designed to increase arable land, may raise a salty
water table to the point where a high level of salinity in the topsoil
removes the land from agricultural use.3 0 An attempt to increase arable
land through tropical deforestation3 1 may cause floods and droughts,
devastating the local population and increasing demands on United
States and international disaster-relief.32 These undesirable conse-
quences may be avoided by proper envirionmental planning, and an EIS
prepared in full compliance with NEPA might suggest alternative
means of providing the same aid, avoiding undesirable consequences.33
An EIS also provides public information about the possible conse-
quences of agency actions and the available alternatives. Such informa-
tion could be very useful to the other nation involved, which may not
have the resources and information required to assess the impact of a
United States action. This informational role of an EIS helps to equal-
ize the information available to both nations, provides for informed
decisionmaking in both, and obviates many of the concerns about sover-
eignty which may seem to limit the scope of the EIS requirement.
Finally, the EIS requirement for federal actions abroad protects
vital American interests. There is great potential for harm to the repu-.
tation of the United States as a supplier of goods and services to other
nations if federal actions are undertaken with callous disregard for en-
vironmental concerns. That potential is present even though most of the
agency projects constitute much-needed aid to poor countries.
It is useful to imagine the diplomatic and political animosity that
may be engendered as a result of major project failures. The Soviet
failure at the Aswan High Dam in Egypt presents a lesson which
" For a detailed and enlightened discussion of this problem see Comment, Controlling the
Environmental Hazards of International Development, 5 EcOLOGY L.Q. 321, 322-27 (1976).
,0 Id. at 326.
31 Id. at 330.
32 CEQ & U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, GLOBAL FUTURE: TIME TO ACT, REPORT TO THE PRESI-
DENT ON GLOBAL REsouRcEs, ENVIRONMENT AND POPULATION 29-31 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
GLOBAL FUTURE].
33 There are many opportunities to shape development in ways that protect renewable
resources for long-term productivity-opportunities that are open to both rich and
poor countries. For example, dams or new industries can be better planned to avoid
adverse impacts on croplands or fisheries. Transportation systems may be developed
that, unlike the auto highway system, do not encourage sprawl and are not solely
dependent on petroleum. Agricultural systems can be built on a more sustainable
resource-conserving basis, which makes use of organic as well as chemical fertilizer,
interplanting of legumes or development of new nitrogen-fixing crops, use of farm
machinery that is the right size to fit the job, and pest control methods that use
natural predators and selective pesticides rather than broad scale application of per-
sistent, destructive chemicals.
GLOBAL FUTURE, supra note 32, at 12.
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should not be ignored. The project was a major blow to Soviet credibil-
ity in aiding underdeveloped countries.3 '
The United States interest in avoiding direct environmental dam-
age from projects it undertakes abroad is thus dear. In addition to di-
rect environmental effects in the other country, there remain two addi-
tional levels of environmental concern. These have been called the
"boomerang" effects, in recognition of the integrated nature of the envi-
ronment whereby an action taken abroad "boomerangs" back to the
United States. 5 The "primary boomerang" effect is illustrated by the
Agency for International Development (AID)'s pesticide export pro-
gram, which raises the possibility of the return of toxic pesticides via
trade winds or through the food chain. 6 Another example might be the
export of a nuclear reactor, such as was recently completed to the Phil-
ippines. The proposed site was within 40 miles of American naval and
air bases," in a volcano and earthquake zone.38 In addition to the obvi-
ous potential for harm to American servicemen and their families, a
nuclear accident could cause significant damage to the world environ-
ment. 9 The United States has an interest in preventing such "primary
boomerang" effects.
United States interests are also implicated in what might be called
"secondary boomerang" effects. Some recent studies have concluded
that if present trends and policies continue, there will be progressive
exhaustion of world resources and degradation of the global
environment.4 °
Unless nations of the world take prompt, decisive action
to alter the trends, . . . the next 20 years may see a decline
in the earth's capacity to support life, while rapid population
growth continues; a steady loss of croplands, fisheries, for-
ests, and plant and animal species; and degradation of the
earth's water and atmosphere."
According to CEQ Chairman Charles Warren, the Aswan Dam project dramatically in-
creased the incidence of a blood disease caused by a water-borne parasite. He cites this as "the
best known case of development gone wrong." C. Warren, Remarks, reprinted in Yost, American
Governmental Responsibility for the Environmental Effects of Actions Abroad, 43 ALB. L. REV.
528, 533 (1979).
Comment, supra note 29, at 350.
Id. at 353.
s Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1345,
1351 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Thirty-two thousand Americans were stationed at Clark Air Base, 40
miles from the site.
a Id. at 1370 n.14.
s The fact that the Philippines does not have any stable salt formations for disposal of radio-
active wastes is also of concern. See Yost, supra note 34, at 533.
40 GLOBAL FUTURE, supra note 32, at i.
4' Id. The United States interest in this problem is not limited to moral concerns. Prevention
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The potential role of an EIS in protecting environmental quality
and preventing global resource conflicts is perhaps best illustrated in
the area of energy, where the interdependence of nations is especially
plain. The world's supply of fossil fuels is scarce, and the United States
interest in easing demand for such fuels is clear. So, for example, if a
developing country calls on the United States to design a power system
for a village, an EIS can help the foreign government by pointing out
alternatives which incorporate renewable energy sources and conserva-
tion. The EIS helps the United States direct its assistance in a manner
designed to reduce global energy demands, thereby reducing the possi-
bility of global energy conflicts.
Overuse of fossil fuels also contributes to degradation of the
human environment. First, fossil fuels increase the level of carbon diox-
ide in the atmosphere which may eventually alter the world's climate
sufficiently to disrupt human activities, especially agriculture.4" Second,
release of sulfur and nitrogen oxides into the atmosphere may cause
acid rain which threatens fish life, decreases agricultural and forest
yields, and contaminates drinking water.4 An EIS analysis would eval-
uate these costs and might suggest less damaging alternatives.
The problems currently facing the world environment which affect
the United States are not limited to energy. Global overpopulation, ag-
ricultural impoverishment, and destruction of marine and freshwater
resources are all matters which affect the United States. 4 For example,
increasing numbers of "ecological refugees" have resulted from the in-
ability of Third World countries to foster economic development while
maintaining environmental quality. "In many parts of the world, from
worn out cropland, barren rangeland, and degraded forestland, migra-
tion is rapidly accelerating. . . . Political barriers may be erected to
contain the migration, but they are hard to enforce."' 5
None of these problems are solved by having federal agencies pre-
of global environmental degradation is also a matter of basic national security:
A downward spiral of poverty, and resource degradation and a growing disparity
between rich and poor could increase the possibilities for frustration and resentment
from those on the short end of the wealth equation, making them more susceptible
to exploitation by others and incitement to violence. Such developments can contrib-
ute to political instability that can threaten the security of all nations, including our
own.
Id. at 5.
42 Id. at 2.
43 Rosencranz, International Perspectives on the Long-Range Transport of Sulfur Oxides, in
AIR POLLUTION CONTROL: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 82, 83 (ABA Standing
Comm. on Envtl. Law, 1979); see also Pearce, The Acid Rain Threat, WORLD PRESS REV., Oct.
1982, at 26.
4 See generally GLOBAL FUTURE, supra note 32.
45 Id. at 7.
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pare EIS's. A coordinated federal policy to assess global needs and pro-
mote international cooperation is necessary."6 Requiring EIS's for fed-
eral actions abroad is, however, a useful first step in the direction of
global environmental responsibility. At the least, the EIS points out the
potential environmental injury which could result from such actions
and informs the other nation involved, allowing it to make the choice
that best suits its national interests. EIS's could also be used by the
federal government to insure that our aid or cooperation best promotes
our interests in an interdependent world.
Many so-called "foreign" actions have an impact upon the envi-
ronment and thus an effect upon the health and welfare of American
citizens. Preparation of an environmental impact statement would sub-
stantially enhance informed decisionmaking and further the goal of en-
vironmental protection. The substantial benefits that would accrue from
the preparation of EIS's for federal actions abroad seem clear.," The
question is whether Congress intended the EIS requirement to apply to
those federal actions.
II. THE BATTLE OVER CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
A. Legislative Intent
The language and legislative history of NEPA are ambiguous on
the issue whether an EIS must be prepared for federal actions
abroad."8 Parts of the Act resemble constitutional provisions in their
4" Id. at 214-29.
47 It is difficult to weigh those benefits against the costs of EIS preparation (in terms of time
and money) because the NEPA component of decisionmaking is not readily separable from other
considerations. The indications in the domestic field are quite positive, however. For example, the
Department of Transportation (DOT) has modified or dropped scores of major highway or air-
port projects "as a result of the EIS process and DOT's resulting capacity and determination to
avoid adverse effects." EIS REPORT, supra note 15, at D-2. The Corps of Engineers spent about
$21 million in 1974 on EIS's, approximately 1.2 percent of its annual operating budget. In 1975,
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission spent about S15 million on NEPA, "which is about 2.2
percent of the cost of one nuclear power plant." Id. at 43-45. Similarly, the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency has found EIS's to be a positive influence in their waste water treatment program:
After calculating project cost increases resulting from an EIS and project cost sav-
ings resulting from an EIS, EPA found that even though costs increased in a
majoriy (31) of the plants, the savings in the 19 other plants, where costs were
reduced, more than offset total increases. The net savings as a result of EIS's for 49
plants was $34.5 million. One EIS achieved extraordinary savings of $438.4 million
because a plant was redesigned on a much smaller, more appropriate scale than the
one originally proposed.
11 CEQ ANN. REP. 372 (1980).
"" The commentary has come down solidly on both sides of the fence. Compare Note, Extra-
territorial Scope of NEPA's Environmental Impact Statement Requirement, 74 MICH. L. REV.
349 (1975) (favoring extraterritorial application) with Brower, Is NEPA Exportable?, 43 ALB. L.
Rev. 513 (1979) and Note, The Scope of the National Environmental Policy Act: Should the
102(2)(C) Impact Statement Provision Be Applicable to a Federal Agency's Activities Having
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breadth and vagueness. Commentators who have focused upon the stat-
utory language have not agreed on whether NEPA does or does not
apply to federal actions abroad.49 Other commentators argue that an
EIS requirement would constitute an extraterritorial application of
United States law. 50 They invoke a general presumption against extra-
territorial applications of United States law "unless the contrary is
clearly indicated by the statute." 1 Thus, it is claimed, such an EIS
requirement would only arise if Congress explicitly stated in the statute
that an EIS shall be prepared for federal actions undertaken abroad.
Such analysis is not entirely convincing. Despite a good deal of
vague language in the statute, the section requiring EIS preparation is
fairly straightforward. Section 102(2)(C) "diiects that, to the fullest ex-
tent possible, . . . all agencies of the Federal Government shall...
include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of
Environmental Consequences Within Another Sovereign's Jurisdiction?, 5 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L.
& COMM. 317, 318 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Environmental Consequences] (opposing extrater-
ritorial application).
4" At the root of the statutory debate is congressional language vacillating between a "na-
tional policy" to benefit "all Americans" and the desire to protect the quality of "the human" or
.man's" environment or "biosphere." The linguistic schizophrenia is amply demonstrated by the
congressional declaration of national environmental policy in § 101:
(a) The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the interre-
lations of all components of the natural environment, . . . declares that it is the
continuing policy of the Federal government,. . . to create and maintain conditions
under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social,
economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Americans.
42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (emphasis added). In particular, the requirement of an environmental impact
statement applies to "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human envi-
ronment," and calls for an assessment of "the relationship between local short-term uses of man's
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity." Thus, environ-
mental impact statements are called for when federal action significantly affects man's human
environment, which would appear to be a global requirement, but this is qualified by a congres-
sional purpose to "assure for all Americans" a healthful environment. The message is unclear and
commentators have reached divergent results. CEQ used the language on the human environment
to conclude that:
[t]he "human environment" is not limited to the United States, but includes other
countries and areas outside the jurisdiction of any country (e.g., the high seas, the
atmosphere). The Act contains no express or implied geographic limitation of envi-
ronment impacts to the United States or to any other area. Indeed, such a limitation
would be inconsistent with the plain language of NEPA, its legislative purpose, the
Council's Guidelines, and judicial precedents.
U.S. Council on Environmental Quality, Memorandum on the Application of the EIS Require-
ment to Environmental Impacts Abroad of Major Federal Actions (Sept. 24, 1976), reprinted in
42 Fed. Reg. 61,068 (1977) [hereinafter cited as CEQ Memo]. See also Krauland, NEPA, Nukes
and Non-Proliferation: Clarifying the Transnational Impact Statement Mandate in Nuclear Ex-
port Licensing, 4 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 201, 214-25 (1981) (analyzing the statutory
language and concluding that the EIS requirement does not apply in the context of nuclear export
licensing).
50 See, e.g., Environmental Consequences, supra note 48; Brower, supra note 48.
51 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 38 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
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the human environment, a detailed statement"5 of the environmental
impact of that proposed action. This language is unambiguous: the re-
quirement applies to "all agencies," and Congress made no specific ex-
emption for the Department of State or agencies involved in foreign
affairs.
53
The argument that an EIS cannot be required because of the gen-
eral presumption against extraterritorial applications of law prejudges
the question. It can be convincingly argued that an EIS requirement is
not an extraterritorial application of law." Even if requiring an EIS
were an extraterritorial application of law, the negative presumption is
not absolute. First, as the reporters' notes to the Restatement of For-
eign Relations Law indicate, "[s]ome federal statutes not specifically
reaching conduct outside the territory of the United States have been
applied to such conduct when it has effects within the territory of the
United States."'5 5 Under this interpretation, two generally worded stat-
utes, the Sherman Anti-Trust Act56 and the Lanham Act 57 have been
applied extraterritorially if there are economic consequences within the
United States.5 8 NEPA's broad language could undoubtedly cover ma-
jor federal activity which, if taken abroad, may have substantial envi-
ronmental effects at home.59
Second, the Restatement relies on Foley Brothers v. Filardo,0 a
decision "based upon the assumption that Congress is primarily con-
cerned with domestic conditions." 61 It is clear that Congress was not
52 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976) (emphasis added).
5S It is unlikely that the missing exemption was a matter of gross congressional oversight.
There was some agency-specific consideration. For example, Senator Muskie expressed concern
that certain NEPA requirements would interfere with the operation of the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Administration and the National Air Pollution Control Administration. 115 CONG.
REC. 40,423 (1969). In addition, Congress did not simply overlook the issue of international envi-
ronmental concerns. It paid specific attention to foreign policy by imposing an additional interna-
tional cooperation requirement on all agencies in § 102(2)(F)., Thus, it is clear that Congress
considered the idea of agency-specific exemptions and that it recognized certain foreign-policy con-
cerns when it enacted NEPA. In spite of these factors, there is no exemption for agencies acting
abroad.
" See infra text accompanying notes 116-34.
5 RESTATEMENT, supra note 51, § 38, reporters' note (1)(ii).
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
6 Trade Mark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1976). The judicial interpretations of the
Lanham Trade Mark Act add the requirement that the defendant be a United States national.
See, e.g., Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
* United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (applying U.S.
antitrust laws extraterritorially); see also Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
" In a specific case, the absence of such impact may militate against preparation of an EIS,
see infra text accompanying notes 192-94, but this should not work against extraterritorial appli-
cation of NEPA generally. Furthermore, an aggregation of such specific, environmentally insignif-
icant cases may have significant, deleterious Gestalt effects.
go 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
61 Id. at 285.
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primarily concerned with domestic conditions when it enacted NEPA.
Congress employed broad, globally oriented language in both the policy
and action-forcing sections.62 While such language does not prove that
NEPA should apply extraterritorially, such expressions do weigh
against a canon of construction which presumes a purely domestic
application.63
The legislative history is not much more revealing than the statu-
tory language as to an EIS requirement abroad. The action-forcing
provisions of section 102 underwent last-minute changes leaving no
time for full consideration of their ramifications." The few legislative
scraps consist mainly of broad policy sAtements that do not directly
address an EIS requirement for federal action abroad. This has allowed
commentators to use the same legislative materials to reach opposite
conclusions.6 5 Indeed, "it is puzzling to see authors focusing on isolated
statements regarding the international environment drawing different
conclusions as to NEPA's transnational application."6 " While Congress
may have been concerned with the global environment, it does not ap-
pear that it considered the issue explicitly.
The issue was explicitly raised at NEPA oversight hearings a year
after enactment. The Department of State, employing the presumption
against extraterritoriality in the absence of clearly expressed intent,
maintained that NEPA did not apply to federal actions abroad. The
oversight committee saw things differently:
Stated most charitably, the Committee disagrees with this in-
terpretation of NEPA. The history of the Act makes it quite
clear that the global effects of environmental decisions are
inevitably a part of the decisionmaking process and must be
considered in that context.
67
Subsequent oversight hearings are technically not considered part of the
legislative history. 8 However, in practice, courts will give subsequent
legislative history "appropriate weight" if it aids interpretation of an
62 See supra note 49.
" This conclusion is supported by the NEPA oversight hearings. See infra note 67 and ac-
companying text.
" F. ANDERSON, supra note 14, at 9.
See supra note 48. -
" Krauland, supra note 49, at 217. See also Comment, Federal Agency Responsibility to
Assess Extraterritorial Environmental Impacts, 14 TX. INT'L L.J. 425, 431-32 (1979).
67 NEPA Oversight Hearings, H.R. REP. NO. 316, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1971) (emphasis
deleted).
" Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 132 (1974) ("[Plost-passage re-
marks of legislators, however explicit, cannot serve to change the legislative intent of Congress
expressed before the Act's passage").
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ambiguous statute. 9
Neither the language of the statute nor the legislative history con-
clusively reveals intent on the issue of whether an EIS is required for
federal actions abroad. According to the plain meaning of the statutory
language, an EIS would be required.70 This is fully consistent with the
congressional purpose in enacting NEPA7 ' and, as will be shown, could
be implemented without serious international law problems.
72
B. The Executive Order
The statutory ambiguity on this issue was exacerbated by a split
within the executive branch' on the interpretation of the EIS require-
ment. The Council on Environmental Quality stated its belief "that the
impact statement requirement in § 102(2)(C) of NEPA applies to all
significant effects of proposed federal actions on the quality of the
human environment-in the United States, in other countries, and in
areas outside the jurisdiction of any country." 3 The CEQ analysis re-
lied upon congressional intent, the legislative history, the post-enact-
ment oversight hearings and legal analysis by courts and commentators
to reach its conclusion.
In contrast, the State Department determined that "[tihe Act
should be interpreted as applying to federal actions occurring in areas
outside the jurisdiction of any other State (i.e. the high seas, Antarctica,
or outer space) but should not be interpreted as applying to actions
occurring within the jurisdiction of another State."74 The State Depart-
ment analysis relied on the presumed extraterritoriality of an EIS pro-
cedure for federal actions abroad and the need "to avoid ill-will and
conflict between nations arising out of one nation's encroachments upon
another's sovereignty." 7 5
The controversy within the executive branch was finally laid to
rest in 1979 by an Executive Order which established procedures gov-
erning the preparation of an EIS for federal actions abroad. Executive
Order No. 12,114, on the Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Fed-
eral Actions, issued by President Jimmy Carter 6 takes into account
69 State of Cal. v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359, 1374 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
70 See supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
71 See supra note 49.
7' See infra text accompanying notes 114-154.
73 CEQ Memo, supra note 49, at 61,069.
74 Memorandum of C. Herter, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Environmental
Affairs, reprinted in Administration of the National Environmental Policy Act: Hearing Before
the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the House Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 551 (1970) [hereinafter cited as State Dep't Memo].
7 Id. at 554.
7' Exec. Order No. 12,114, 3 C.F.R. 356 (1980), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (Supp. IV
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some of the foreign policy considerations relevant in defining the scope
of NEPA;7 it is, however, inadequate for environmental protection be-
cause it allows agencies virtually unbridled discretion in determining
whether to prepare an EIS. In addition, it does not provide a right of
action against a noncomplying agency, as NEPA does. The Executive
Order attempts a compromise but accepts as its underlying premise the
State Department perspective that EIS preparation would constitute an
infringement of foreign sovereignty.
The Order's definition of environment is narrower than
NEPA's.78 The scope of the environmental statements to be prepared is
narrower as well. A full EIS is only required for actions which affect
the "global commons" (areas outside the jurisdiction of any nation);79 it
is allowed as one of three alternatives for actions affecting globally im-
portant resources, as designated by the President.8" For all other major
federal actions,81 the Order requires one of two truncated assess-
ments-bilateral8 2 or concise8 reviews-or, in the case of most ac-
tions" with effects confined to the nation in which the action takes
place, no environmental assessment at all.
85
There is a list of exemptions, most of which are consistent with
NEPA.86 Thereafter, however, is a list of "considerations" which allow
an agency to modify the process if it needs to "decide and act
1980) [hereinafter cited as Exec. Order].
7 See infra text accompanying notes 97-154.
7' Exec. Order, supra note 76, § 3-4. The definition includes "the natural and physical"
environment but "excludes social, economic and other environments." That conflicts with case law
to a certain extent. Once an impact on the environment is established, a domestic EIS considers a
range of social, economic, and cultural factors. See supra note 14. See also Sierra Club v. Cole-
man, 405 F. Supp. 53 (D.D.C. 1975), vacated and remanded sub nom. Sierra Club v. Adams, 578
F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Such a limited definition may represent a valid foreign policy limita-
ion in some circumstances. Presidefit Carter presumably thought that consideration of such factors
would conflict too much with foreign sovereignty. In any particular case that may be true; in
many, it may not be. In any case, a balancing approach seems preferable. See infra notes 155-201
and accompanying text.
7, Exec. Order, supra note 76, § 2-4(b)(i).
Id. § 2-4(b)(iv).
*l See id. § 2-3.
52 Id. § 2-4(ii).
' Id. § 2-4(iii).
" Actions with effects limited to the nation where the action takes place require an assess-
ment only if the action involves toxic products or radioactive substances. Id. § 2-3(c).
" For example, construction of a hydroelectric project would require no environmental asess-
ment, despite its potential for causing floods and dislocation of population. See Comment, The
"NEPA-Abroad" Controversy: Unresolved by an Executive Order, 30 BUFFALO L. REV. 611, 653
(1981).
" See Gaines, "Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions"." An Executive
Order Ordains a National Policy, 3 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 136, 153-55 (1979). For example, the
Executive Order exempts "actions not having a significant effect on the environment," § 2-5(a)(i),
and "actions taken by the President," § 2-5(a)(ii). Neither of these would require an EIS under
NEPA because NEPA only applies to actions of federal agencies which have significant effects. 42
U.S.C. § 4332(2) (1976).
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promptly,"87 or desires to avoid "infringement in fact or appearance of
other nations' sovereign responsibilities." ' Other "concerns" allowing
modification include a need for "commercial confidentiality"8 9 or an as-
serted "difficult[y] of obtaining information and agency [in]ability to
analyze meaningfully environmental effects of a proposed action."90
What emerges from the "considerations" is a license for agencies to
interpret the Executive Order with a "begrudging attitude"9 1 and avoid.
environmental considerations virtually at will.
The Order "is solely for the purpose of establishing internal pro-
cedures for Federal agencies . . . and nothing in this Order shall be
construed to create a cause of action."92 An aggrieved environmental
group may not base its claim on the Executive Order to require review
of a federal agency's proposed action.9 " The ability of private parties to
challenge a decision not to prepare an EIS, or to question its adequacy,
has been a principal reason for NEPA's success." A properly drafted
order, giving full effect to the mandates of NEPA, would have reduced
confusion and facilitated enforcement of the Act had it provided for a
private right of action.95
Thus, potential litigants still seek an interpretation of NEPA
which would allow judicial review of environmental impact analysis for
federal actions abroad. 6 Such an interpretation must overcome the ma-
jor policy argument against requiring an EIS for federal actions
abroad; that is, the belief that such a requirement would constitute an
unreasonable infringement on foreign sovereignty.
'7 Exec. Order, supra note 76, § 2-5(b)(i).
" Id. § 2-5(b)(ii) (emphasis added).
89 Id. § 2-5(b)(iii)(3).
- Id. § 2-5(b)(iii)(5).
91 Comment, supra note 85, at 656 (quoting CEQ criticism of the Defense Department's
regulations adopted under the Executive Order).
,2 Exec. Order, supra note 76, § 3-1.
93 If an agency did not comply with the Order, a plaintiff could sue under NEPA, see supra
note 21 and accompanying text, and could, of course, cite the Order for its persuasive value, since
it represents the considered view of the President as to how to further the purpose of NEPA. See
Exec. Order, supra note 76, § 1-1. If the agency has complied, it similarly may invoke the Order.
But a reviewing court must still interpret the statutory (NEPA) directive to determine whether the
agency has in fact complied with the Act.
94 See supra text accompanying note 21.
" The President might not have had the power to have done so, however, since the creation
of a right of action is a legislative function reserved for Congress. See Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 422 U.S. 560, 575-78 (1979).
" See Gaines, supra note 86, at 158.
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III. DOES REQUIRING AN EIS FOR FEDERAL ACTIONS
ABROAD CONSTITUTE AN INFRINGEMENT ON FOREIGN
SOVEREIGNTY?
A. General Considerations
The reluctance to require EIS's for major federal actions abroad
stems from the belief that assessment of the impact of such actions in
other countries would infringe upon foreign sovereignty. The State De-
partment's position illustrates this well.9 State concluded that requir-
ing an EIS for actions occurring in the global commons is appropri-
ate,98 whereas those actions occurring within another sovereign's
jurisdiction should be exempt from such requirement. 9 The State De-
partment recognized that Congress did not intend to limit the scope of
NEPA to the territorial United States' 0 but was anxious "to avoid ill-
will and conflict between nations arising out of one nation's encroach-
ment upon another's sovereignty."' '
It is indeed important for the Uniied States to respect the spirit of
comity among nations and to avoid environmental and economic poli-
cies which smack of a "new imperialism."'01 2 It is questionable, how-
ever, whether American programs would appear more "imperialistic" if
tempered with environmental concerns. As it is, foreign development
projects are imbued with American standards and priorities. The addi-
tion of environmental concerns would merely be another American fac-
tor in foreign project decisionmaking. As one commentator detailed the
process:
[M]any projects are conceived, planned, and supervised
wholly by American officials. 'Applications' for loans are
often written at the AID [Agency for International Develop-
ment] mission and sent to the recipient only for signature.
Foreign governments should have decisionmaking authority
so that they can implement their own development priorities
and objectives. But, given current procedures, AID's myth
serves only as an excuse for giving inadequate consideration
to the environment. 03
State Dep't Memo, supra note 74, at 546.
" Id. at 554.
Id. at 554-55.
100 Id. at 554.
101 Id.
102 For a general discussion deploring the application of United States legal standards to
actions in other nations, see Grundman, The New Imperialism: The Extraterritorial Application
of United States Law, 14 INT'L LAW. 257 (1980).
'" Comment, supra note 29, at 347.
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Lesser-developed countries may indeed view American environ-
mental policy as an encroachment on their sovereignty. They may feel
it is unfair for the United States, which accumulated its wealth while
largely ignoring environmental concerns, to limit their growth through
environmental controls:
The arguments in support of their position, now familiar,
focus first on the inequity of requiring the less developed
countries to divert scarce resources to environmental quality
in order to rectify the past environmental depredations of de-
veloped nations; and second, on the financial burden that the
developed nations themselves should bear in order to achieve
environmental quality.
1 0 4
The experience of AID demonstrates, however, that developing
countries are concerned about the environment.1 0 5 Those nations have
"come increasingly to recognize the interrelated nature of environment
and development" ' 6 and to appreciate environmental analysis which
provides a framework for environmentally responsible projects.
Concerns that environmental analysis will result in additional
financial burden on developing countries are not insuperable. First, an
EIS does not necessarily result in a more costly alternative; rather, it
may save the foreign government money.107 Second, if indeed it is found
that American environmental standards are increasing the costs of es-
sential development programs, the United States may consider adding
an amount to its grant to offset the economic loss caused by environ-
mental protection.
Finally, the preparation of an EIS should be viewed as an attempt
to respect foreign sovereignty by providing information to the foreign
nation.108 In the domestic context, one court has stated, "[a]t the very
least, NEPA is an environmental full disclosure law."' 9 Other coun-
tries have a need to know the potential negative consequences of United
States actions within their borders.11 They may not have the technical
capacity to determine those consequences themselves.11 An EIS sug-
'"Tarlock, The Application of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 to the Darien
Gap Highway Project, 7 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 459, 468 (1974).
106 At the request of the Office of Management and Budget, the Agency for International
Development prepared an analysis of its experiences with NEPA. Some of its observations are
quoted in CEQ documents reprinted in 124 CONG. REC. 11,801-06 (1978).
106 Id. at 11,802.
207 See supra note 47.
208 CEQ documents, reprinted in 124 CONG. REC. 11,804 (1978).
209 Environmental Defense Fund Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749, 759 (E.D. Ark.
1971).
150 CEQ documents, reprinted in 124 CONG. REC. 11,804 (1978).
I Id.
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gests alternatives""2 and allows the foreign government to make an in-
telligent, fully informed decision.1"
Thus, the requirement that the United States prepare an EIS for
federal actions abroad does not, per se, violate international concepts of
sovereignty. While an EIS would evaluate conditions in a foreign coun-
try, it does so in connection with a United States action, and provides
the other nation with information on alternatives which may preserve
its environmental quality.
B. Does Requiring an EIS for Federal Actions Abroad Constitute
an Extraterritorial Application of United States Law?
Another, more doctrinal way of examining NEPA's potential in-
fringement on foreign sovereignty is to ask whether the requirement of
an EIS for federal actions abroad is an extraterritorial application of
United States law. The answer to that question depends upon whether
one characterizes an EIS as a procedural tool for American decision-
making 1 " which does not seek to prescribe conduct occurring in an-
other state or as a process which requires other states to adopt United
States environmental standards, including intrusive site-specific inspec-
tion. 1 5 Each position is set out in more detail below.
1. A Mere Procedural Requirement
The typical extraterritorial application of United States law in-
volves an action which' may or may not have been legal by the stan-
dards of the country in which it took place declared illegal by a United
States court. The court is on firmer ground if it rules against American
citizens acting abroad, 1 but it may also pass judgment upon foreign
nationals.'1 7 The American court may grant damages or provide in-
junctive relief.11
12 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii) (1976).
... See Robinson, Extraterritorial Environmental Protection Obligations of Foreign Affairs
Agencies: The Unfulfilled Mandate of NEPA, 7 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 257, 261 (1974).
1" See Gaines, supra note 86, at 141.
11 See Robinson, supra note 113, at 260.
116 A nation may govern the actions of its citizens, wherever they ae located, under the na-
tionality principle of jurisdiction. RESTATEMENT (REVISED OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 402(2) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981) [hereinafter cited as REVISED
RESTATEMENT].
"I See, e.g., United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
The foreign defendant must have some minimum contacts with the United States for an American
court to exercise in personam jurisdiction.
"' Jurisdiction to enforce is distinguished from jurisdiction to prescribe and refers to the
ability of a state to compel or induce compliance with statutes, regulations or judgments. REVISED
RESTATEMENT, supra note 116, § 401(2).
19821
370 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 131:353
Such extraterritorial application of United States law has become
a sore point with other countries, particularly when the action forbid-
den by the American court is encouraged by the foreign government.' 9
Some nations have responded to this "legal imperialism" by enacting
retaliatory legislation which limits the effect of United States
judgments.2 °
NEPA's foreign impact is quite different. The statute applies only
to Americans (the administrators of federal agencies) and creates a pro-
cess by which they can, while acting within the United States, reach an
enlightened policy decision by taking into account foreign environmntal
effects. A federal decisionmaker would have the legal obligation to pre-
pare an EIS and to give its implications good faith consideration.2 1
The environmental analysis does not, however, determine the fate of
the contemplated action. After weighing environmental factors, the
decisionmaker remains free to subordinate those factors to other policy
considerations. A project causing considerable environmental harm may
still be approved:
The harm against which NEPA's impact statement re-
quirement was directed was not solely or even primarily ad-
verse consequences to the environment; such consequences
may ensue despite the fullest compliance. Rather NEPA was
intended to ensure that decisions about federal actions would
be made only after responsible decisionmakers had fully ad-
verted to the environmental consequences of the actions, and
had decided that the public benefits flowing from the actions
outweighed their environmental costs.2 2
NEPA does not declare any private action taking place abroad to
19 For example, in United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center, Inc., 1963
Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), discussed in H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNA-
TIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 1041-46 (1976), a United States court found American and Swiss
defen-dants to be violating the Sherman Antitrust Act through their participation in a consortium
controlling the export of Swiss watches to the United States. The Swiss government had en-
couraged the practice, and reacted to the judgment by requiring (as opposed to its former practice
of permitting) the "illegal" conduct. This removed the activity from United States judicial scrutiny
under the foreign compulsion doctrine. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 419(1)(b) (Tent Draft No. 3, 1982).
2" For example, the British Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980 grants the Minister
of Trade discretion to direct persons in the United Kingdom to disobey extraterritorial court or-
ders of another country, if it is determined that compliance would damage British trading interests
or infringe on British jurisdiction. See REVISED RESTATEMENT, supra note 116, at 91-92. See
generally, Sornarajah, The Extraterritorial Enforcement of United States Antitrust Laws Conflict
and Compromise, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 127 (1982).
"1 See supra text acccompanying notes 23-24.
122 Jones v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency, 499 F.2d 502, 512 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975).
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be illegal. EIS preparation "would not impose American environmental
standards on any other country. Even if the federal activity abroad is
unlawful in the United States, NEPA does not prevent its being under-
taken abroad.1 23 Furthermore, since NEPA binds only American offi-
cials, there is no need to seek enforcement of the law in a foreign fo-
rum, as is the case when United States law applies to foreign
defendants.1 2'
NEPA is thus more closely akin to the myriad laws which direct
federal decisionmakers to scrutinize other nations for certain types of
behavior or which require certain conditions be met before extending
aid or engaging in certain types of trade. The Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 '125 requires that before approving developmental assistance AID
must consider the degree to which programs integrate women into the
economy,"O as well as the possibility of using aid to "support demo-
cratic social and political trends in recipient countries."1 2 7 The Nuclear
Nonproliferation Act. 28 requires the NRC, before approving a nuclear
export license, to consider the recipient nation's willingness to cooperate
with American nonproliferation objectives. 29 The Jackson-Vanik
amendment to the Trade Act 1 0 denies most-favored-nation status to
Communist countries that restrict emigration. 31
None of those statutes seeks to prescribe action in foreign jurisdic-
tions. The United States cannot require foreign employers to hire more
women or direct Communist states to ease emigration. Similarly, the
United States would evoke great international wrath if it tried to use
the Clean Air Act 32 to prosecute a Mexican manufacturer whose
smoke emissions did not meet EPA standards. 33 NEPA, on the other
hand, ceates no substantive environmental standards and compliance
with its requirements is merely a step in the administration of an
American program. "[I]t seems elementary that this country may prop-
erly impose conditions upon the granting of unilateral aid to any coun-
113 CEQ documents, reprinted in 124 CONG. REC. 11,802 (1978).
124 See discussion of the Imperial Chemical Industries litigation, H. STEINER & D. VAGTS,
supra note 119, at 1029-40.
125 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151-2443 (1976).
126 Id. at § 2151(k).
I d. at § 2218(c).
128 22 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3282 (1976); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021-2159 (Supp. III 1979).
122 42 U.S.C. §§ 2156, 2157 (Supp. III 1979).
130 19 U.S.C. § 2432(a) (1976).
l1 Id. See also Note, An Interim Analysis of the Effects of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment
on Trade and Human Rights: The Romanian Example, 8 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 193 (1976).
1- 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1976).
", Similarly the Canadians would not be very successful if they attempted to apply Cana-
dian law to our utility emissions, even assuming such emissions contribute to "arid rain." These
kinds of problems can, however, be addressed by bilateral or multilateral treaties.
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try, and if it chooses to consider environmental implications in the defi-
nition of these conditions, no one can legitimately object to them."
1 4
2. An Effective Limitation of Foreign Choice
It is somewhat misleading, however, to characterize the EIS re-
quirement as a purely domestic activity. The most obviously intrusive
element of an EIS review of United States actions abroad is the need to
examine site-specific impacts. The scope of an EIS can be quite
broad."35 In Sierra Club v. Coleman,'"8 the Federal Highway Adminis-
tration (FHWA) was helping to construct a portion of the Pan-Ameri-
can Highway through the Darien gap in Panama and Colombia. The
district court held that FHWA had failed to consider whether alternate
routes might have a less deleterious effect on the native Choco and
Cuna Indians who lived in the area of the proposed construction,"'
and ordered anthropological and ethnographic analysis. 8' Such analy-
sis requires Americans or their proxies to undertake site-specific re-
search, which may be seen as an extraterritorial application of United
States law: an American court (or legislature) directs a course of action
to take place within a foreign jurisdiction. And when the collected data
are used by American decisionmakers to choose among available alter-
natives, the unavoidable infusion of American values may cause great
resentment."' 9 In the Philippines reactor case, 40 Judge Wilkey recog-
nized that application of NEPA abroad lacks the prescriptive nature of
other extraterritorial reaches, yet' realized the limitations that an EIS
might impose on a foreign nation's choices, declaring that "failure to
perceive extraterritorial consequence[s] . . .would be naive. 141 Thus,
while a strong case can be made that the EIS requirement is not an
extraterritorial application of United States law 4 and that any in-
fringement of national sovereignty is limited,1 43 we must recognize the
potential for international disagreements as to the scope and legitimacy
14 H.R. REP. No. 316, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1971) (NEPA Oversight hearings).
135 "Human environment," 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976), has been construed to include
the physical, aesthetic, historic, cultural, social and economic dimensions of environmental impacts.
EIS REPORT, supra note 15, at 49.
1 8 405 F. Supp. 53 (D.D.C. 1975) (injunction issued halting construction).
137 Id. at 56.
138 421 F. Supp. 63, 68 (D.D.C. 1976) (ruling on the sufficiency of the final EIS).
2 Usually, however, not enough resentment to cause the foreign country to refuse the
United States aid.
140 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1345
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
141 Id. at 1357.
See supra text accompanying notes 116-34.
143 See supra text accompanying notes 97-113.
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of American legislation in this area. These more intrusive aspects of the
EIS requirement must be scrutinized against traditional standards of
international law.
When Congress does not explicitly outline a statute's extraterrito-
rial consequences, the courts will assume that the jurisdictional reach of
the statute comports with international law.144 The standards in inter-
national law145 governing how far a state may extend the reach of its
laws have historically been expressed through fairly rigid legal doc-
trines,'1 46 based, for example, on where the regulated activity took place
or on the nationality of the actor. The requirement that an EIS be
prepared for federal actions abroad fits easily within such established
principles.
147
The conduct involved in preparing and using -an EIS in federal
decisionmaking may be justified as conduct occurring within the terri-
tory of the United States. Even when a site-specific examination in a
foreign country is required, a substantial part of the EIS preparation
and use will occur within the United States as agencies located within
the United States evaluate a project. Examinations and decisions which
take place "in the field" (within the foreign jurisdiction) will require
the consent of the foreign state to enter the jurisdiction but will not
require the United States government to direct the other state's activi-
ties, as inspections will be made by United States government employ-
ees. The EIS requirement may also be justified under an effects analy-
sis because if the proposal is approved, it may have substantial
environmental effect within the United States.
1 48
144 See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953); Murray v. The Schooner
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
145 International law is part of the domestic law of the United States. See The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
46 They are: territorial, based on the place where the action occurred; nationality, allowing
jurisdiction over one's own nationals for actions undertaken abroad; protective, referring to the
national interests of the forum state; universality, by which certain heinous criminals can be tried
anywhere; and passive personality, referring to the nationality of the injured party. These princi-
ples are listed in decreasing order of acceptance. See Almond, Reach of United States Regulatory
Authority Over Environmental Impacts of its Activities, 44 ALB. L. REV. 739, 763 (1980).
'47 These principles are set forth in the REVISED RESTATEMENT, supra note 116, as follows:
§ 402. Bases of Jurisdiction to Prescribe
Subject to § 403, a state may, under international law, exercise jurisdiction to
prescribe and apply its law with respect to
(1)(a) conduct a substantial part of which takes place within its territory;
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its
territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory which has or is intended to have substan-
tial effect within its territory;
(2) the conduct, status, interests or relations of its nationals outside its terri-
tory. ...
148 See id. at § 402(1)(c) for the effects test in international jurisdiction.
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While requiring an EIS for federal actions abroad is acceptable
under traditional principles of jurisdiction, it must also be scrutinized
under a "reasonableness" test that courts have recently used to supple-
ment such principles, which often seemed unfairly rigid.1 9 The test
simply tempers those principles in light of the interests of the recipient
country. That analysis was used in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
America,5 ' where the Ninth Circuit held that even though it had the
proper subject-matter jurisdiction, as a matter of international comity
and fairness it must balance the competing interests of the countries
involved to determine whether United States extraterritorial jurisdiction
should be asserted." 1 This "jurisdictional rule of reason,"' 52 which has
been adopted by the Restatement,5 ' will be used in the next section to
'" See infra note 153.
180 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976); see also In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d
1248 (7th Cir. 1980); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
151 549 F.2d at 613-15.
The elements to be weighed include the degree of conflict with foreign law or pol-
icy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal places
of business of corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either state can be
expected to achieve compliance, the relative significance of effects on the United
States as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit pur-
pose to harm or affect American commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the
relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the United States as
compared with conduct abroad.
Id. at 614.
1" Id. at 613.
' § 403 Limitations on Jurisdiction to Prescribe:
(1) Although one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402 is present, a state
may not apply law to the conduct, relations, status, or interests of persons or things
having connections with another state or states when the exercise of such jurisdic-
tion is unreasonable.
(2) Whether the exercise of jurisdiction is unreasonable is judged by evaluating
all the relevant factors, including:
(a) the extent to which the activity (i) takes place within the regulating
state, or (ii) has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the
regulating state;
(b) the links, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, be-
tween the regulating state and the persons principally responsible for the
activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the law or
regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regu-
lation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such
activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is gen-
erally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or
hurt by the regulation in question;
(e) the importance of regulation to the international political, legal or
economic system;
(f) the extent to which such regulation is consistent with the traditions
of the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating
the activity;
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by other states.
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test the reasonableness of NEPA's EIS requirement.'"
Thus far, this Comment has argued that the preparation of an
EIS for federal actions abroad would make a substantial contribution
toward the goal of environmental protection. Concern about potential
infringements of sovereignty led to the promulgation of an Executive
Order which is inconsistent with the directives of NEPA because it re-
stricts the scope of the EIS requirement. While certain valid objections
can be made to a requirement of an EIS for federal actions abroad,
those objections can best be dealt with within the statutory framework
of NEPA, supplemented by judicial review using a balancing standard.
IV. A BALANCING APPROACH
A. The Statutory Framework
Courts should require agencies to go beyond the Executive Order
and adhere to the requirements of NEPA itself for two reasons. First,
as discussed above, 55 strong arguments can be made that the Order
does not execute the Act. Second, the EIS requirement of NEPA is
sufficiently flexible to accomodate concerns of sovereignty in the context
of federal actions abroad.
Section 102(2)(C) states that "to the fullest extent possible" all
agencies shall prepare environmental impact statements on major fed-
eral actions. 15' This phrase has been read expansively to ensure strict
compliance with the statute,157 but it was also intended to allow an
agency to avoid preparing an EIS if an "existing law applicable to such
(3) An exercise of jurisdiction which is not unreasonable according to the crite-
ria indicated in Subsection (2) may nevertheless be unreasonable if it requires a
person to take action that would violate a regulation of another state which is not
unreasonable under those criteria. Preference between conflicting exercises of juris-
diction is determined by evaluating the respective interests of the regulating states in
light of the factors in Subsection (2).
REVISED RESTATEMENT, supra note 116, § 403(1)-(3).
154 The court in the Philippines reactor case also called for a conflict of laws analysis, but it
did not explicitly delineate the relevant factors. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n., 647 F.2d 1345, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("Some balancing, or recognition of
latent conflict of laws, would seem judicious to reconcile the separate but not inconsistent national
interests to regulate reactors with an eye to health, safety and the environment.").
155 See supra notes 73-91 and accompanying text.
2- 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (1976) (emphasis added).
M We must stress as forcefully as possible that the language does not provide an
escape hatch for footdragging agencies; it does not make NEPA's procedural re-
quirements somehow "discretionary." Congress did not intend the Act to be such a
paper tiger. Indeed, the requirement of environmental consideration "to the fullest
extent possible" sets a high standard for agencies, a standard which must be rigor-
ously enforced by the reviewing courts.
Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972).
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agency's operation does not make compliance possible.11 58 In Flint
Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Association of Oklahoma,"'
the Supreme Court construed a statute which gave the Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development only thirty days to act to suspend a
land development disclosure statement. Otherwise it would automati-
cally become effective. The Court held that the statutorily mandated
thirty-day limit precluded the application of NEPA's EIS requirement
because it would be impossible to complete the EIS process within
thirty days.160
A similar statutory conflict arguably existed in Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,"", which in-
volved the export of a nuclear reactor to the Philippines. Approval of a
license for a nuclear power plant is a major federal action because of
the great degree of federal control and responsibility involved, 62 so this
was prima facie covered by NEPA. The majority opinion did not re-
quire EIS preparation but Judge Robinson's concurrence"' rested spe-
cifically on a statutory conflict with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act
of 1978.1" Congressional policy underlying that Act envisions the
United States preventing proliferation of nuclear arms by establishing
itself as a supplier of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, thus pre-
empting less responsible suppliers who might not control weapons-
grade materials as scrupulously. 1 5 That policy requires quick, affirma-
tive action which would arguably be hindered by preparation of an
EIS. This statutory conflict exception can be extended to other areas of
foreign action in which Congress demands swift action.
That "escape clause" could be used by courts to avoid conflicts
between requiring an EIS and the limitations of international law. The
extraterritorial application of United States law should be limited so as
not to encroach unreasonably on another state's sovereignty, 66 particu-
larly if Congress did not expressly intend otherwise. 67 Thus, while the
general presumption established in NEPA would require the prepara-
15 Section-by-section analysis of Senate changes to NEPA, reprinted in 115 CONG. REC.
40,417-19.
159 426.U.S. 776 (1976).
'60 Id. at 791; see also United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (when forced compliance with NEPA would undermine purpose
of § 15(7) of the Interstate Commerce Act, courts have no jurisdiction to enjoin compliance).
1 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
162 Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1110-14
(D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972).
163 647 F.2d at 1385-88.
I" See supra note 128.
165 647 F.2d at 1360.
' See supra notes 147-54 and accompanying text.
167 See supra text accompanying note 144.
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tion of an EIS for any major federal action abroad significantly affect-
ing the environment, Section 102(2)(C) would excuse preparation of an
EIS where it would unreasonably infringe another nation's sovereignty.
To determine whether preparation of an EIS would infringe foreign
sovereignty, a number of factors should be considered.
B. Relevant Factors: Agency Determinations and Judicial
Review
The determination whether an EIS should be prepared requires
consideration of the policies embodied in NEPA and the dictates of in-
ternational law. The agency should first determine, using the standards
it applies to domestic actions, whether an EIS is warranted"6" and then
decide whether the extraterritorial nature of the project allows or pro-
hibits the preparation of an EIS. This process results in the agency's
decision which is subject to judicial review upon the request of a party
with standing."" Thus, agencies will be guided in their actions by judi-
cial precedent.
The process is not administratively infeasible. Currently, federal
agencies contemplating major action conduct a preliminary environ-
mental assessment as part of the threshold decision."' At that point,
the agency can consider the elements in the balancing equation, along
with the usual domestic factors,"' as they have been enunciated by the
judiciary. As with a decision on whether to prepare an EIS for domes-
tic projects the agency will have to develop an adequate evidentiary
record and faithfully consider existing precedent.1" NEPA has, how-
ever, sufficient procedural flexibility to avoid public scrutiny of secret
information whose disclosure might jeopardize national security.178
Judicial review of such agency decisions has developed an implied
cause of action under NEPA. Congress did not specify how NEPA was
to be enforced, and the Act does not even mention judicial review." 4 It
was the courts that determined judicial review to be "crucial to NEPA
I" See supra text accompanying notes 13-17.
169 A plaintiff has standing if he was injured in fact and was "arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute." Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970); see also United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); infra note 177.
170 See F. ANDERSON, supra note 14, at 24.
171 See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
17 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Scenic Hud-
son Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
173 "To the extent national security or essential foreign policy considerations make controlled
circulation of environmental statements necessary, NEPA provides sufficient procedural flexibility
to accomplish this." CEQ Memo, supra note 49, at 61,069.
274 F. ANDERSON, supra note 14, at 16.
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implementation. "175 As one commentator has noted, the active role
taken by the courts in "reviewing agency compliance with NEPA [is] in
large part because private citizens interested in NEPA's enforcement
have been granted standing to sue."' 6 In fact, the courts have been
quite lenient in finding adequate grounds for standing.17"
The courts have closely scrutinized agency decisions on whether to
prepare an EIS for domestic projects178 so it is likely that they would
be equally vigorous in reviewing agency determinations regarding ex-
traterritorial restrictions on such preparation. The circuits are split on
what should be the proper standard of review. The most widely ac-
cepted standard seems to be that a reviewing court will defer to the
agency on such a decision unless the decision was arbitrary and capri-
cious. 17 9 Courts are also willing to overturn agency decisions if the re-
17' Citizens for Clean Air v. Corps of Engineers, 349 F. Supp. 696, 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
see Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 1401 (D.D.C. 1971); Students Chal-
lenging Regulatory Procedures (SCRAP) v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 189 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd
on other grounds, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); see also F. ANDERSON, supra note 14, at 16-17.
176 F. ANDERSON, supra note 14, at 26. The process has been similar to, although not as
explosive as, the creation of a private right of action under SEC Rule 10b-5. See Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983).
17 See id. at 27-39. Although the major prerequisite to standing is injury in fact, see supra
note 169, plaintiffs alleging a "variety of aesthetic, conservational, and recreational interests" have
successfully brought suit. Id. at 27. Although a mere interest in a problem is insufficient to gain
standing, Sierra Club v. Morton, 305 U.S. 345 (1972), several courts have granted standing to
plaintiff organizations which could allege injury to only a few of their members. See e.g., Ward v.
Ackroyd, 351 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Md. 1972); Sierra Club v. Mason, 351 F. Supp. 419 (D. Conn.
1972). At least one commentator has argued that NEPA, because it created a new right of the
public to be informed of environmental effects of federal projects, in effect established a new set of
injurable interests. F. ANDERSON, supra note 14, at 36. Beyond alleging injury, the plaintiff must
also show that the injury is "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected by the statute."
Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). In most cases,
however, any injury that would result from the environmental impact of a project has been consid-
ered arguably within the protected zone of NEPA. See e.g., Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1
(D.D.C. 1971); F. ANDERSON, supra, at 30.
1S See F. ANDERSON, supra note 14, at 23.
17, See id. at 96-105. The arbitrary and capricious test is based on the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976), which the Second Circuit found persuasive in Hanly v. Klein-
dienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 108 (1973). In that case the court remarked,
"We see no reason for application of a different approach here since the APA standard permits
effective judicial scrutiny of agency action and concomitantly permits the agencies to have some
leeway in applying the law to factual contexts in which they possess expertise." Id. at 829-30. For
other decisions in which the standard was applied, see, e.g., Hiram Clarke Civic Club v. Lynn,
476 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973); Steele Creek Community Ass'n v. Department of Transp., 435 F.
Supp. 196 (W.D.N.C. 1977), aff'd mem., 570 F.2d 346 (4th Cir. 1978); Mid-Shiawassee County
Concerned Citizens v. Train, 408 F. Supp. 650 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Groton v. Laird, 353 F. Supp.
344 (D. Conn. 1972).
Other courts, following the Fifth Circuit's lead in Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d
463 (5th Cir. 1973), have taken a more active judicial role by applying a test of reasonableness,
relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402 (1971). The Fifth Circuit noted in Kreger that "Overton Park teaches that a more penetrating
inquiry is appropriate for court-testing the entry-way determination of whether all relevant factors
should ever be considered by the agency." 472 F.2d at 466. For other applications of the reasona-
bleness test, or "hard look" test, S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULA-
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cord developed regarding how the decision was made is inadequate, 80
although they cannot require the agencies to engage in more extensive
procedures than Congress required."81 And although the courts may not
substitute their own view of the facts for those of an agency, 82 an ad-
ministrative interpretation of NEPA and international law can be di-
vorced from the agency's findings of fact to allow the courts to play a
vigorous role in reviewing an agency's interpretation of the EIS re-
quirement.' Thus, it is likely that a court would perform its own
balancing analysis in determining whether the agency decision was
correct.' 8
Although the courts have historically been reluctant to review
agency decisions in the field of foreign affairs, they have not been de-
terred from adjudicating arguably "political questions" if the inquiry
involves interpretation of a congressional directive.'18 The balancing
approach advocated here is designed to interpret the language of a fed-
eral statute. Additionally, the political question doctrine is a judicial
means of avoiding decisions on matters in which an agency has particu-
lar expertise and which are not within the scope of judicial compe-
tence.'88 In the case of NEPA there is no implementing agency (the
CEQ has only an advisory role), and the judiciary has already become
expert at interpreting the statutory directive underlying EIS prepara-
tion. The somewhat political nature of the extraterritorial application
issue should not hinder judicial review. Thus, although the agency
TORY POLICY 291-93 (1979), see, Get Oil Out, Inc. v. Andrus, 477 F. Supp. 40 (C.D. Cal. 1979);
Pokorny v. Costle, 464 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Neb. 1979); and Simmons v. Grant, 370 F. Supp. 5
(S.D. Tex. 1974).
,$0 See F. ANDERSON, supra note 14, at 23-26; see also supra note 172.
161 See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
U.S. 519 (1978). Chances are courts may still require agencies to take a "hard look" at all the
available evidence, and to use such procedures as necessary, since that is arguably the intent of
Congress. For a lively debate on the issue, see Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of
Administrative Procedure, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1805 (1978); Byse, Vermont Yankee and the Evolu-
tion of Administrative Procedure: A Somewhat Different View, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1823 (1978)
and Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Courts' Role in the Nuclear Power Controversy, 91 HARv.
L. RE V. 1833 (1978).
182 See F. ANDERSON, supra note 14, at 96; see also Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390
(1976) (court should not substitute its own judgment for that of the agency with regard to assess-
ment of environmental effects of a project; court's role is to ensure that agency has taken a "hard
look" at such effects).
183 See F. ANDERSON, supra note 14, at 96.
18 While it may be argued that an agency, such as AID, that frequently must make such
decisions concerning EIS's for foreign projects will develop expertise that courts should defer to,
the fact remains that such decisions involve the kinds of issues (statutory interpretation, the law of
foreign relations, comity) that courts are expert in.
15 See Vermilya-Brown v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948) (court ruled against State Depart-
ment because the inquiry required interpretation of what Congress meant by a United States
"possession").
188 See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
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should make an initial determination as to preparing an EIS, using the
balancing approach, the reviewing court should make its own indepen-
dent determination, using the same balancing approach.
Such balancing requires explicit consideration of at least five
factors:
1) Conflict with foreign law or policy.1 17 This factor along with
the next one, the potential for direct environmental harm to the United
States, should be given the most weight. Preliminarily, the agency
should determine whether the foreign government objects to prepara-
tion of an EIS."'8 If there is no objection, then the EIS can be prepared
with the cooperation of that government and there is no sovereignty
issue. If the recipient nation does object to an EIS, requiring one is not
per se a violation of international law. It then becomes necessary to
measure the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy that would
come from applying NEPA. For example, the foreign government will
be most vociferous in objecting to NEPA review if it has its own sub-
stantive environmental laws or NEPA-like procedures,189 especially if
they have already been applied administratively or judicially. For ex-
ample, in In re Babcock & Wilcox,'"0 a German environmental group
petitioned the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for standing to
challenge the export of a nuclear reactor to Germany. Germany had
already conducted a hearing at which the petitioners were allowed to
raise environmental concerns in their challenge to construction of the
reactor. German law had already affirmatively addressed environmental
concerns, so if the NRC had granted standing the interference with
foreign sovereignty would have been great. Consequently, the petition
was refused.19'
2) Potential for direct environmental harm to the United States.
This factor requires analysis of the probability of direct harm to the
United States as well as the magnitude of such harm. The greater the
'67 This was the first factor considered in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549
F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), and is reflected in the REVISED RESTATEMENT, supra note 116,
§ 4 03(g) & (h).
188 This would be determined through a demarche by the State Department to the other
government.
"' Some of the countries that have been impressed with the United States EIS procedure and
have adopted environmental assessments of their own are: Canada, Columbia, Japan, New Zea-
land, the Soviet Union, Australia, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Sweden, and France. Lutz, Directions of Environmental Law in the International Sys-
tem: An Assessment of Tasks and Challenges for Lawyers, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION AND
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS: AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM 191, 192 (International Bar Ass'n 1978).
2- 5 N.R.C. 1332 (1977).
'" Id. Also, the "full disclosure" justification for applying NEPA abroad, supra text accom-
panying notes 108-13, does not apply when the foreign government has its own, adequate review
process.
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potential injury, the more important it is that United States law apply
and an EIS be prepared to protect the primary beneficiaries of NEPA,
the American people.
This factor is an extension of the effects doctrine for determining
jurisdiction in international law, whereby a country claims jurisdiction
based on the significant effect that the activity has on that country. The
doctrine is presently applied to economic effects, such as antitrust viola-
tions abroad that restrain American trade.192 The original and more
widely accepted prong of the effects -doctrine, however, involves direct,
physical effects, such as firing a bullet from one state into another." '9
Pollution moving from one state to another falls under the direct physi-
cal effects prong of the doctrine and thus provides a reasonable basis for
asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction.
3) Degree of United States control over the project. Many projects
are conceived and planned by United States policymakers, with little
foreign participation.1' Where American participation and responsibil-
ity are large the sovereign interests of the recipient nation in preventing
an EIS are smaller. On the other hand, if the project is largely the
work of a foreign government, with the United States merely providing
some of the funding, foreign sovereign interests are great:
To the extent that funds are transferred with no strings at-
tached and the recipient determines the uses to be made of
them, any environmental controls mandated by the U.S.
would be impractical and imperialistic. But where the im-
portant planning decisions are made by U.S. officials, our
government ought to be compelled to conduct a study of en-
vironmental consequences as rigorous as that required for
domestic projects. 95
An analogous standard is reflected in domestic NEPA jurisprudence
which exempts state projects funded through revenue sharing programs
from the EIS requirements.'"
4) Extent of environmental assessment activity which takes place
within the United States, as opposed to within the foreign jurisdiction.
A project specially designed for the recipient country, such as a flood
control dam, will require more site-specific research and decisions than,
for example, a nuclear reactor,1 97 which has a more generic design, the
' See supra note 148.
13 REVISED REsTATEMENT, supra note 116, § 403 reporters' note 3.
15 See supra text acccompanying note 103.
135 Comment, supra note 29, at 337.
'"See, e.g., Carolina Action v. Simon, 7 Env. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1807 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
17 This is a relative distinction. A nuclear reactor requires a great deal of on-site examina-
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effects of which may have been the subject of previous impact state-
ments.19 Greater site-specific activity, with the specter of American
technicians descending upon the foreign jurisdiction to analyze the envi-
ronment, implies greater intrusion on the foreign sovereign, and weighs
against an EIS.
5) Other United States interests. The United States is a country
which, perhaps to a greater extent than many other nations, has de-
fined its interests on a global level. Our ability to achieve our foreign
policy goals depends in part upon our reputation as a responsible part-
ner in projects with other nations. That more subtle American interest
may weigh in favor of applying NEPA extraterritorially. Additionally,
environmentally irresponsible actions in far corners of the globe may
have indirect, "secondary boomerang" effects upon the United States
itself.199
That last factor is less important than the others because it in-
volves more attenuated effects on the United States. It should not be
ignored by a reviewing court, however, because the United States has a
legitimate interest in protecting current and future generations of
Americans from the adverse effects of worldwide environmental
deterioration.
C. Using the Balancing Approach to Decide Cases
The balancing-of-interests approach does not afford the same un-
limited and unreviewable discretion to administrative agencies as the
Executive Order.20 ° It requires an EIS for federal actions abroad unless
preparation of an EIS conflicts with another statutory command or
with international law and comity limitations. Conflict with interna-
tional law is judged by balancing the listed factors. A determination not
to prepare an EIS is subject to judicial review to ensure that the agency
considered the relevant factors, and that its decision was neither arbi-
trary nor capricious.20'
Using this test, it is possible to envision five categories of federal
action and determine the applicability of the EIS requirement.
1) Federal action within the United States with potential effects in
tion as well. In re Babcock & Wilcox, 5 N.R.C. 1332, 1345 n.10 (1977).
19 In Sierra Club v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 4 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENvTL. L. INST.) 20,685
(D.D.C. 1974), the AEC agreed to prepare a generic impact statement on United States nuclear
power export activities. For the result, see Energy Research and Development Administration
(ERDA), Final Environmental Statement on U.S. Nuclear Power Activities 1542 (Apr. 1976).
19 See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
200 See supra text accompanying notes 86-91.
201 See supra notes 178-83 and accompanying text.
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other countries.2"' This category would virtually always require prepa-
ration of an EIS as it involves the least infringement upon foreign sov-
ereignty. Any examination of the project site is within United States
jurisdiction, and if it is necessary to enter a foreign jurisdiction to assess
impacts, the foreign government is unlikely to object because the United
States is acting to protect the foreign environment without imposing
any attendant costs. 20 8 In Wilderness Society v. Morton,2"' Canadian
environmental groups were granted standing to intervene in a challenge
to the sufficiency of an EIS prepared by the Secretary of the Interior
for the trans-Alaska pipeline. One of the proposed routes for the oil
included a pipeline through Canadian territory, and the other involved
shipping the oil through the Juan de Fuca Straits, in which any oil
spill could threaten Canadian fishing, logging and shoreline-recreation
industries. 20 5 The court held that the Canadian environmentalists inter-
ests were sufficiently antagonistic to the United States environmental
plaintiffs' interests as to merit intervention.'" The case implies a non-
discretionary rule: when action is undertaken within the United States,
any alternatives that would have foreign impacts must be covered by an
EIS.20 If the foreign government refuses to allow access to examine the
possible harm, the EIS will be less complete but should still be pre-
pared with available information. Such a view allows the United States
to protect the environment and follow its duty in international law not
to use its territory so as to pollute that of another.208
•02 This category does not cover federal actions centered in a foreign country, upon which
this Comment has focused, but it is important regarding the more general issue of global environ-
mental responsibility. Also, the case discussed shows a judicial willingness to extend NEPA's ben-
efits to foreigners.
103 It is possible that the foreign government might object on the basis that the proposed
project might have beneficial "spillover" effects (e.g., jobs created in Mexico as a result of a project
in Texas dose to the border), which might be jeopardized by the EIS. Account can be taken of
such concerns.
s-4 463 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
:03 Id. at 1262.
06 Id. at 1262.63.
20 The State Department agrees. State Dep't Memo, supra note 74, at 552.
Impact statements for United States action with effects abroad have been successfully pre-
pared. Examples include the Colorado River International Salinity Control Project, affecting
Mexico, and an AEC EIS on the nuclear explosion in Amchitka, Alaska, which was provided to
the Japanese and Canadian governments. 5 CEQ ANN. REP. 400 (1974).
208 The 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm ex-
pressly adopted this rule of customary international law in its final documents:
Principle 21
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principle
[sic] of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursu-
ant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activi-
ties within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of
other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Principle 22
States shall co-operate to develop further the international law regarding liability
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2) Federal actions taking place in, or affecting the "global com-
mons." There is general agreement that an EIS is required here.209 No
infringement of foreign sovereignty takes place and congressional con-
cern with the global environment210 is respected.
3) Federal actions within other countries with substantial effects
on the United States. Actions within this category usually should re-
quire the preparation of an EIS, given the potential impact on the
United States. For example, Sierra Club v. Adams2 . involved the con-
struction of the Darien Gap portion of the Pan-American Highway in
Panama. The United States government provided two-thirds of the
funding for the segment.21 2 Its construction presented the possibility of
the spread of aftosa (hoof-and-mouth disease), a dreaded livestock
killer, to the United States."'3 The court held that the Federal High-
way Administration's EIS adequately addressed the problem, without
explicitly holding that NEPA applied at all.2 4
An explicit ruling based on NEPA would clarify this category,
and would not be controversial as most agencies agree that an EIS is
required.2"n The United States obviously has strong interests in
preventing the spread of aftosa to its cattle. Those interests may be
overridden only if the foreign government has its own strongly protec-
tive environmental laws, preferably involving NEPA-like assessments,
which make information available to federal agencies and protect the
United States. In addition, as noted above, the other nation's assessment
should be given deference only if that country objects to an EIS. Other-
wise, an EIS should be required.
4) Federal action within another country with effects on third
countries. This is the first category requiring case-by-case balancing.
and compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental damage
caused by activities within the jurisdiction or control of such States to areas beyond
their jurisdiction.
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1420
(1972); see also Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1976)
(arbitration over air pollution damage); Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 10 ENVTL. L. REP.
(ENVTL. L. INST.) at 50,016 n.153 (Albania held responsible for damage to a British ship).
There is a movement toward an international law and legal institutions to police environmen-
tal offenses. See generally Lutz, supra note 189; ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION
AND DEVELOPMENT, COMPENSATION FOR POLLUTION DAMAGE (1981).
'" See State Dep't Memo, supra note 74; CEQ Memo, supra note 49; Exec. Order, supra
note 76; Nuclear Regulatory Commmission position in In re Babcock & Wilcox, 5 N.R.C. at
1339.
210 See supra text accompanying notes 64-67.
211 578 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
212 Id. at 390.
as Id. at 390-94.
214 Id. at 391-92 n.14.
ss See supra note 209.
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The United States has a strong interest in protecting itself from liabil-
ity, whether legal or political. That interest will be especially strong if
the federal action is a project which includes the potential for a major
disaster, such as a dam whose rupture might flood a neighboring coun-
try. A high degree of American control over the project is again an
important factor favoring an EIS. Here, too, the strongest factor aginst
an EIS would be adequate environmental protection laws in the recipi-
ent nation, coupled with a relatively small probability of harm to a
neighboring country. The initial presumption, however, should favor
an EIS.
5) Federal action within another country with effects confined to
that country. This is the most controversial area, and it has been the
subject of an explicit judicial ruling on NEPA's extraterritorial reach.
In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion21 1 (the Philippines reactor case), the court held that an EIS was
not required for the issuance of a nuclear export license, when the ef-
fect of the export would be confined solely to the recipient country.217
The majority mentioned conflicts of law,2"' but did not proceed to bal-
ance interests. The decision seemed to rest on a belief that this was an
area more appropriate for international cooperation than unilateral EIS
review.2" Judge Robinson's concurring opinion was more convincing,
however, as it relied on the conflict between EIS review and the time
requirements of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (NNPA).220
The holding is probably sound from a legal standpoint, although it
is at least arguable that Congress did not intend the NNPA to override
an EIS requirement.221 Nevertheless, the decision, which gave consider-
able weight to the court's view of public policy, may from that stand-
point be unwise. The Philippine Islands are located in one of two of
the world's earthquake belts and are in a volcano belt as well.22 2 The
site of the proposed reactor was about five miles from Mount Natib ,223
a volcano which would probably be considered "active" under NRC
criteria.224 The site was also near two United States bases with
thousands of American citizens. The Philippines have no stable salt
formations and thus are in no position to dispose of radioactive
21' 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
217 Id. at 1347-48.
218 Id. at 1357.
219 Id. at 1366.
220 See supra text accompanying notes 161-65.
221 See supra note 10.
222 647 F.2d at 1370.
223 Id. at 1370 n.14.
224 Yost, supra note 34, at 533.
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wastes."2 5 An EIS would have made that clearer to the agency that
granted the license. Additionally, an EIS would have revealed that
other energy sources, such as hydropower or geothermal energy, would
have been considerably cheaper.22
The court in the Philippines reactor case specifically limited its
holding to nuclear exports whose effects are confined to the recipient
country. It left open the question of NEPA's extraterritorial reach gen-
erally,2 7 so a balancing approach remains appropriate. Under NEPA,
a federal agency acting abroad should usually expect to prepare an EIS
for such a project. If the recipient government objects, the agency
should weigh the competing interests. Any effect on globally important
resources would weigh in favor of an EIS. Potential for truly horrible
effects on the local population and a high degree of United States con-
trol over the project would imply a moral duty in favor of an EIS. It
should be kept in mind that the preparation of an EIS in no way
means the project must be cancelled. It simply ensures rational deci-
sionmaking and the consideration of available alternatives. 2 8
On the other hand, since this category involves the greatest possi-
ble infringement on foreign sovereignty, an EIS should not be prepared
if it mainly involves analyzing competing social decisions, such as
whether to relocate the Indian tribes in the Panama highway case. 2
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment has reviewed the issue of whether an EIS should
be required for federal actions abroad. The extraterritorial reach of the
National Environmental Policy Act was not explicitly considered by
Congress, so the Comment considered policy reasons for and against
EIS's for foreign projects, and concluded that although NEPA applies
to agency action concerning foreign projects and EIS's are generally
required, they are not required in every case. Exceptions based on a
balancing-of-interests approach that limits extravagant reaches of na-
tional jurisdiction would suffice to meet both the language of NEPA
and international-law and foreign-policy objections. 30
There are those who believe that applying NEPA to foreign
projects will harm United States interests by imposing requirements
"s Id.
11 Id. at 533-34.
2 647 F.2d at 1366.
" See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
u1 See supra note 136.
20 Needless to say, the main problem with a balancing approach as a guide to deciding cases
is that it provides little concrete aid to a judge faced with a hard case. On the other hand, the
problem does not easily lend itself to mechanical tests. See supra notes 2-9 and accompanying text.
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that foreign governments will avoid by turning to other countries for
aid. Those other countries may be hostile to the United States, and in
any case might not share our concern for the environment."3 1 That is a
myopic view. Proper environmental management, inspired by NEPA
but accepted by other nations as well,2"' will not only enhance the
United States global reputation, but may also enhance our national se-
curity as the probability of global resource conflicts is reduced. Addi-
tionally, future generations will have a better chance of inheriting a
habitable earth. In an era of global interdependence NEPA's prescrip-
tion of minimally infringing environmental analysis should be applied
to most federal actions abroad, with proper but not extravagant respect
paid to foreign sovereignty.
"'1 For the view that applying NEPA to United States projects abroad amounts to a form of
unilateral disarmament, see Almond, supra note 146.
2" See supra note 198.
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